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That Americans overwhelmingly support principles of racial
equality while opposing government measures designed to achieve
racial equality is a conundrum which social scientists have yet to
definitively resolve.1 Social scientists have offered a wide range of
explanations for why Americans do not support affirmative action,
but few studies have specifically examined the ways in which
affirmative action policies might be reconceived to garner popular
support. This Article reviews and critiques three theories-the
American Values Theory, Self-Interest Theory, and New Racism
Theory-that explain American opposition to race-targeted
policies. This Article argues that while no one theory can fully
explain America's position on affirmative action policies, each
offers valuable insights into what an affirmative action policy
must look like to win popular support. From this literature
review, this Article identifies four criteria that an affirmative
action policy must meet to be politically successful.
To test the viability of these four criteria, this Article
examines their role in the passage of one of the most radical
affirmative action laws in recent U.S. history: the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). Passed in 1990 during the rise of the anti-
affirmative action backlash, the ADA's "reasonable
accommodation" requirement explicitly requires employers to take
account of, and provide special treatment for, an individual's
disability. That such radical legislation could pass with
overwhelming bipartisan support from both houses of Congress
*Ph.D. candidate, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Department of Sociology.
J.D., University of Minnesota Law School 1997. B.A., Amherst College, 1993. The
author wishes to thank Professors Gary Sandefur and Mark Suchman for their
invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. This Article takes as its primary focus the issue of affirmative action for
racial and ethnic minorities. Many of the arguments, however, also apply to the
cases of affirmative action for women and other historically disadvantaged groups.
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and a Republican President suggests that valuable lessons can be
learned from the success of the ADA for future race-targeted
policy.
I. Explaining America's Contradictory Attitudes on Issues
of Race
A. White Attitudes Toward Racial Equality and Affirmative
Action
Support for the principle of equal treatment for minorities
has steadily increased among the American public since the early
1940s. Since 1944, when national opinion surveys first asked
whether Blacks and Whites should be given an equal chance at
jobs,2 the proportion of the population (Black and White) who
responded affirmatively rose from 42% in 1944, to 47% in 1946 and
1947, 83% in 1963, 87% in 1966, and 95% in 1972.3 Attitudes
about equal treatment in other areas such as integration in
housing and education have followed similar patterns over time. 4
While Americans have widely accepted the principle of equal
treatment, they remain deeply divided on the issue of the
government's role in assuring equal treatment for racial
minorities.5 "Implementation questions"-designed to measure
support or opposition to actions that the government should take
to end discrimination-are often regarded by researchers as a
more genuine indicator of support for civil rights than responses to
questions on principles alone.6 Researchers have found that fewer
people endorse the implementation of a principle than endorse the
principle itself in every area they investigated-from
desegregation in schools to busing.7
Affirmative action questions, one form of implementation
2. Surveys have typically phrased the question as follows: "Do you think
Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job, or do
you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?" PAUL
BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS 44 (1998).
3. See id. at 46. By 1972, when public opinion on this question reached ceiling
levels, the National Opinion Research Center dropped the "equal jobs" question
from their national survey. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN
AMERICA 111 (1997).
4. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 120-21.
5. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD G. CARMINES, REACHING BEYOND RACE
3 (1997) (arguing that the clash about race in the United States should be
interpreted in the context of a deeper debate about the proper role of government in
addressing race-related issues).
6. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 121.
7. See id. at 137.
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question,8 concern specific actions that the government might take
to improve the economic and social status of Blacks.9 The term
"affirmative action" represents a broad array of government
policies, ranging from government expenditures to assist Black
communities to preferential treatment in hiring or admissions. 10
A Special Counsel Report to the President of the United States
provides a useful definition: affirmative action is "any effort taken
to expand opportunity for women or racial, ethnic, and national
origin minorities by using membership in those groups that have
been subject to discrimination as a consideration [in
decisionmaking or allocation of resources.]""
Nonpreferential affirmative action policies do not favor one
racial group over another, mandate quotas, or set aside a
particular benefit based on race. 12 These policies include, but are
not limited to, recruiting and counseling, affirmative marketing,
and data collection and disclosure of statistics regarding minority
participation and success. 13  Race-conscious nonpreferential
affirmative action plans are intended to remedy Black
disadvantage in the modern labor market caused by informal
recruitment and promotion mechanisms that tend to exclude or
ignore Black candidates. 14 Such policies aim to increase the pool
8. See id. at 170.
9. See id. at 101.
10. See id. at 171-72.
11. CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 16-17 (1996); see also
JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 6-8 (1996) (providing a
brief history of the term "affirmative action").
12. See Adams, infra note 13, at 1402-03 (defining "nonpreferentiar' methods of
affirmative action).
13. See Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIS. L
REV. 1395, 1402 (1998). Professor Michelle Adams illustrates with two
hypothetical examples of race-targeted, nonpreferential affirmative action
strategies:
A hypothetical employer seeks to fill several positions. Hoping to make its
selection from the broadest possible pool of applicants, the employer
advertises in the classified section of two newspapers: the New York Times
and the Amsterdam News, a newspaper with a primarily black readership.
In both advertisements, the employer identifies itself as an "equal
opportunity employer" and states that "women and minorities" are
encouraged to apply.
[Another] employer adopts strong reporting procedures requiring the
organization to monitor the race and gender of those it recruits, those it
hires, and those it promotes. That information is forwarded to top
management and assists top management in formulating additional
recruiting efforts to attract and retain minorities and women at the
organization.
Id. at 1395.
14. See Lawrence Bobo et al., Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a
Law and Inequality
of qualified minorities by informing them of a benefit that had
previously been denied to them because of biased
decisionmaking. 15 While these forms of affirmative action are
race-targeted in the sense that they acknowledge past and present
implications of race in our society, they do not necessarily burden
any other group in the competition for scarce benefits. 16 As a
result, such forms of affirmative action have, for the most part,
gone unchallenged in the courts, in legal scholarship, and in public
debate.' 7
Affirmative action may also refer to explicitly preferential
policies: set asides, goals and time tables, quotas, or any program
in which a scarce benefit is allocated on the basis of race or
ethnicity.'8 It is primarily these forms of affirmative action that
have sparked legal, academic and public debates.
Overall, there is little White support for affirmative action in
any of its forms.' 9 Researchers have found that those specifically
supporting preferential treatment range from a third of the public
down to a few percentage points of those polled, depending on the
phrasing of the question.20 Programs designed to help Blacks gain
access to higher education generally receive more support than
programs for hiring and promotion.21 This may be because such
Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology, in RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1990'S:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 15 (Steve A. Tuch & Jack K Martin eds., 1997); MARK
GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACT AND CAREERS (1974)
(discussing the importance of informal interaction in a job search); see also Kathryn
M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and Inner-
City Workers, 38 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 433, 437-41 (1991) (noting that social scientists
have found that employers often rely on informal employee networks to generate
job applicants and target neighborhoods and media outlets that have smaller Black
populations and constituencies).
15. See Adams, supra note 13, at 1397.
16. One could argue, however, that information itself is a scarce benefit-
neither recruiting nor recordkeeping is free; if an organization targets minorities, it
is presumably spending less on other groups.
17. See Adams, supra note 13, at 1397.
18. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 n.1 (1986) (noting that
preferential, or "hard" forms of affirmative action might include "reserving a
specific number of openings exclusively for members of the preferred group").
19. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 182-83.
20. See id.; James Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith, Affirmative Action Attitude.
Effects of Self Interest, Racial Affect, and Stratification Beliefs on Whites' Views, 61
SOCIAL FORCES 797 (1983) (discussing White opposition to programs seen as
promoting preferential treatment); see also Seymore Martin Lipset & William
Schneider, The Bakke Case: How Would It Be Decided at the Bar of Public
Opinion?, PUBLIC OPINION, March/April, 1978, at 38. (stating that most Americans
reject the use of conventional affirmative action and preferential treatment).
21. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 3; Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20; see also
Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20.
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programs are seen by Whites as an attempt to "level the playing
field," whereas employment is often seen as the final "game"
itself. 22
Despite the paucity of support for affirmative action and
implementation policies, some have found in these statistics a
silver lining. Schuman and his colleagues observed that a large
proportion of Whites will opt for a vague middle position (e.g.,
spending should be "kept about the same") on these questions
when it is an option, suggesting that while there is not strong
support for these policies, neither is there strong opposition.23
Political leaders on both sides of the issue therefore appear to have
a fair amount of room for persuasion. It could be this potential for
changing public opinion that is driving the quest to understand
the "gap" between support for equality in principle and in practice.
The following sections explore three theoretical explanations for
America's ambivalence toward equality and affirmative action.
B. The American Values Theory
American Values theorists posit that the gap between
American support for equality in principle and in practice may be
explained by an ongoing tension between two competing American
values: egalitarianism and individualism. 24
The principle that "all men are created equal" with certain
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, has been
characterized as "one of the most magnetic forces in United States
life" 25 and as "the most powerful and influential concept in
American history."26 The principle of egalitarianism has been the
battle cry of not only the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, but also
the civil rights and women's movements, and more recently, the
22. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 3; Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20; see also
Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20.
23. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 177; Joseph F. Fletcher & Marie-
Christine Chalmers, Attitudes of Canadians Toward Affirmative Action:
Opposition, Value Pluralism, and Nonattitudes, 13 POL. BEHAV. 67, 80-81 (1991)
(finding that a great many of those Canadians who say they oppose affirmative
action could be persuaded to reconsider their opinion); see also SNIDERMAN &
CARMINES, supra note 5, at 18 (stating that while White Americans tend to
disapprove of most affirmative action policies, a majority does believe that an extra
effort should be made to see that Blacks are treated fairly).
24. See Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20, at 43 (arguing that inconsistencies
in survey data on racial attitudes are due to the tension between core American
values).
25. J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 13-14 (1978).
26. BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 277 (1992).
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gay and lesbian and disability movements.
At the heart of the American Creed, however, side by side
with the principle of equality, stands the equally compelling
principle of individualism. According to this ideal, jobs and
economic rewards are allocated exclusively on the basis of
individual talent, effort, and training.27 The principle stands most
clearly for the idea that people should be judged as individuals,
and neither stereotyped nor classified on the basis of their gender,
race, religion, or ethnicity. 28
While most Whites believe in equal opportunity, they also
believe that inequality serves a positive function in American
society and that relative position in the social hierarchy should be
based on demonstrated ability and individual effort. 29 Thus
Whites will support programs that help Blacks acquire skills
necessary to compete because they are consistent with the value of
equality of opportunity, but will reject programs seen as promoting
preferential treatment because they perceive them as violating
dominant equity norms.3 0
The tension between individualism and egalitarianism-the
former suggesting a system of social stratification based on
individual merit, and the latter implying a system of social
equality-helps explain America's ambivalence to issues of racial
justice. Seymour Lipset and William Schneider argue that
Americans believe strongly in both individualism and
egalitarianism, but at any point in history they will tend to favor
one ideal more strongly than the other. 31 They observed that
while most White Americans strongly endorsed the original,
egalitarian goals of the Civil Rights Movement, the White public
has not favored, and indeed has outright rejected, the Civil Rights
Movement's more recent focus on substantive equality.32
Lipset and Schneider found that Americans make a critical
distinction between compensatory action-policies designed to
27. See Lawrence Bobo & James R. Kluegel, Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-
Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 443, 446
(1993) (discussing the characteristics of the belief in individualism that would
explain opposition to certain forms of affirmative action).
28. See id. (arguing that the provision of rewards based on group status violates
the American cultural norm of individualism).
29. See Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20, at 801; see also James R. Kluegel and
Eliot R. Smith, Whites' Beliefs About Blacks' Opportunity, 47 AM. SOC. REV. 518,
523-25 (1982) [hereinafter Kluegel & Smith, Whites'Beliefs.
30. See Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20, at 801.
31. Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20, at 43-44.
32. See id.
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help disadvantaged groups catch up to the standards of
competition set by majority society-and preferential treatment-
policies that suspend those standards by admitting or hiring
members of disadvantaged groups who do not meet the same
standards as White males. 33 Americans, in other words, want the
terms of the competition to be fair, but they do not want to give up
the competition itself. Thus, Americans tend to favor
compensation for past deprivations in the form of special training
programs, such as Head Start, but will draw the line at
predetermining the results of the competition.3 4
Kluegel and Smith found similar results in their studies of
racial attitudes in the early 1980s. In 1983, they found that
programs designed to help Blacks win jobs (e.g., job training
programs) or gain access to higher education (e.g., scholarships or
education programs) have the support of about 70% of the White
public.35 Programs seen as promoting preferential treatment, on
the other hand, were overwhelmingly opposed by close to 90% of
White Americans. 36 Their explanation, like that put forth by
Lipset and Schneider, was rooted in the individualist ideals of the
American public. While a majority support programs that involve
changing individuals to fit the existing stratification order, a
majority oppose programs that appear to call for change in the
stratification order itself.3 7 Greater support, for example, can be
found for job training programs for the disadvantaged than for
programs that establish a minimum income for all workers.38
Empirical evidence on Whites' beliefs about the stratification
system and Black disadvantage appear to support the American
33. See id. at 41. A strong argument can be made however, that the distinction
between compensatory and preferential treatment or "equality of opportunity"
versus "equality of results" is not always clear. Admissions to elite schools, for
example, may be seen as a reward for prior achievement in an earlier competition.
From this perspective affirmative action would be a form of preferential treatment
or equality of results. By contrast, one could argue that attendance at competitive
schools is essentially a "meal ticket" to entry into the professional classes. See
generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998)
(demonstrating the effects of an elite education on Black and White students).
From this perspective, affirmative action is intended to ensure equality of
opportunity. See Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20, at 45. Such distinctions
therefore, are often no more than a way of talking about the extreme poles on a
continuum of perspectives on affirmative action.
34. See Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20, at 41.
35. See Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20, at 797.
36. See id.
37. See JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY 212
(1986).
38. See Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 27, at 446.
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Values Theory. Kluegel and Smith found that the degree to which
Whites believe the current stratification system already provides
equal opportunities for all people is related to their views on
affirmative action. 39 The more Whites perceive the opportunities
for Blacks as being equal to their own, the more likely Whites will
fault Blacks themselves for Black disadvantages, and the less
likely Whites will approve of affirmative action.40 Indeed, Kluegel
and Smith have found that a majority of Whites see opportunities
for Blacks as equal to or exceeding those of the average person in
America. 41 Similarly, Schuman and his colleagues found that
declining numbers of Whites list discrimination as an explanation
for Black disadvantage. 42 Given that Whites deny the prevalence
of discrimination and place most of the blame for Black
disadvantage on Blacks themselves, it does not seem surprising
that Whites would not support affirmative action policies.
As persuasive as the American Values Theory seems to be,
there are compelling arguments for why it is an incomplete
explanation for America's lack of support for affirmative action.
While the evidence from studies on attitudes toward race-targeted
policies indicates that there is a real tension between American
ideals of equality and egalitarianism, framing the issue only in
terms of American ideals obscures the role race plays in
opinionmaking on issues of affirmative action. It suggests that
Americans judge race-targeted policies solely by their consistency
with personal views on equality and merit, with no consideration
for the race of the beneficiaries of these programs. Neither
empirical nor historical evidence supports the argument that
opinions on affirmative action programs are in fact formed on the
basis of American values alone.
Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders have demonstrated in their
recent work on racial attitudes that public opinion depends not
39. See KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 37, at 212-13.
40. See Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20, at 801.
41. See KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 37, at 49; see also Kluegel & Smith,
Whites' Beliefs, supra note 29, at 519-23 (Explaining that there is in fact, no
research to support the claim that Blacks' opportunities are equal to or better than
the average opportunities of Whites. One would need to demonstrate that Blacks
receive higher occupational earnings and returns to human capital than Whites.
Recent evidence shows that while the earnings of Blacks are approaching those of
Whites, they are still lower than what Whites receive on average).
42. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 155 (explaining that Whites instead
cite low motivation as the most popular explanation for Black disadvantage); see
also PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 40-41 (1993) (finding
that Whites cite lack of genuine effort and irresponsibility as reasons for current
Black disadvantage).
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only on beliefs of individual citizens-their personal interests,
political principles and feelings toward social groups-but also on
the way an issue is framed.43  When the authors asked
respondents for their views on the same policy, framed in
alternative ways (designed to mimic the rival frames that prevail
in contemporary discourse), they found that Whites and Blacks
were significantly more likely to support race neutral programs
than programs explicitly targeting Blacks alone.44
Bobo and Kluegel found that while Americans do value
opportunity-enhancing policies (e.g., training and education
programs) over equal-outcomes policies (e.g., hiring quotas), the
race of the policy's beneficiaries also mattered.45 When they
compared American attitudes toward race-targeting policies with
attitudes toward income-targeting policies, they found that race
targeting significantly diminishes Whites' support for both
opportunity-enhancing policies and equal-outcomes policies
relative to similar income-targeted policies. 46
Historical evidence also contradicts the theory that
Americans are opposed to race-targeted policies because they are
morally committed to the ideal of individual merit. If Americans
are in fact committed to the ideal of merit, then they ought to
closely guard the system of meritocracy. 47 Yet American history is
43. See DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL
POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 163-95 (1996) (discussing the concept of
frames-4he use of specific concepts and terms to present options in a highly
influential way--in the context of race-targeted policies); Shanto Iyengar, Framing
Responsibility for Political Issues: The Cases of Poverty, 12 POL. BEHAV. 19, 20
(1990); Barbara McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative
Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982) (concluding that responses from both
physicians and patients were less favorable when the statistics describing the
results of a surgery were presented in terms of morality rather than survival rates);
see also Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (finding that consumers respond more favorably to
reduced gasoline prices for paying cash than they would to a credit card penalty).
44. See KINDER AND SANDERS, supra note 43, at 165, 193.
45. See Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 458-59.
46. Compare KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43, at 193-94 (summarizing
experiment results that showed White Americans supported opportunity-enhancing
programs designed for the poor rather than programs aimed at Black Americans),
and Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 458-59 ("Race-targeting reduces support for
opportunity-enhancing policies by about 22% on average relative to similar income-
targeted policies. The impact of race-targeting is even larger when comparing
policies that lean toward equalizing outcomes for blacks and whites."), with
Fletcher & Chalmers, supra note 23, at 84-85 (finding that Canadian attitudes
about affirmative action are not very well explained by the two values of equality
and merit since only about 3% of the variance in attitudes toward affirmative
action is attributable to the two values).
47. See SKRENTNY, supra note 11, at 37 (describing, by example, how the
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replete with examples of special preferences bestowed on groups in
a decidedly unequitable and nonmerit-based way. 48  John
Skrentny describes, for example, preferences given to veterans in
civil service (called veterans' preferences rather than affirmative
action) with the full backing of public opinion.49 The federal
government and forty-seven states give preferences to veterans
who take civil service exams by adding ten points to the scores of
disabled veterans and their wives and five points to the scores of
non-disabled veterans. 50 After the points are added, the civil
service typically prefers veterans over non-veterans with equal
scores. 51  Indeed, seven states give absolute preferences to
veterans who pass the exams. 52
Arguably, veterans' preferences are different from
preferences based on race because racial preferences apply
indiscriminately to all African Americans, whereas veterans are
compensated specifically for serving their country. 53 Skrentny
observes however, that veterans' preferences are also
indiscriminate, failing to distinguish between those drafted and
those who volunteered, those who fought and those who had a
"safe" desk job. 54 Indeed they also extend to widows and wives of
the disabled.55
This poses the possibility that the American public perceives
veterans as justified exemptions from the merit competition. 56
Only when groups are assumed to be unworthy of special
treatment, Skrentny suggests, do Americans invoke the
democratic ideal of individual merit. 57 It is not, in other words,
that Americans object to special preferences per se, but only to
their racial beneficiaries.
uncontroverted preference to veterans is not based on merit).
48. See id. at 36-60 (presenting veterans' preferences and nepotism as examples
of special preferences that have gone unchallenged in American society).
49. See id.
50. See id. at 37. (stating that federal service exams ironically were designed to
ensure merit hiring).
51. See id. at 37-38.
52. See id. at 38.
53. See SKRENTNY, supra note 11, at 58-59.
54. See id. at 59.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 60-62 (discussing the issue of moral worth in the context of
American justice and merit).
57. See id. at 239.
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C. New Racism Theory
The widespread support for principles of equal treatment
suggest that Americans today understand it is socially
unacceptable to express overt, blatant prejudice. Proponents of
the New Racism Theory argue that this does not necessarily mean
such prejudice has been eradicated, but rather that it has taken on
new forms. Often labeled "symbolic" or "modern racism,"58
adherents of this view argue that Americans vent racial hostility
today indirectly, such as in agreeing with statements like "the
government pays too much attention to blacks" or "blacks who
receive welfare could get along without it if they tried."59
Partial support for the New Racism Theory as a predictor of
attitudes toward affirmative action programs has been found not
only by Sears and McConahay, but also by Jacobson,60 Kluegel and
Smith,6' Bobo and Kluegel,62 and Kinder and Sanders. 63 Jacobson
compiled a New Racism Scale by selecting questions from a Louis
Harris and Associates survey that approximated those used by
McConahay to measure symbolic racism. 64 While he found that
the New Racism Scale was the strongest predictor of attitudes
toward affirmative action, it was not the only predictor-old-
fashioned racism and self-interest were also moderate predictors. 65
Kluegel and Smith similarly found some support for the New
Racism Theory, but also concluded that all opposition to
affirmative action cannot be seen as indicating White racial
58. See David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN
CONTROVERSY 53, 56-57 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988)
(explaining that symbolic racism has involved antagonism toward Blacks' demands,
resentment about special favors for Blacks, denials of continuing discrimination
and lack of sympathy with the anger of Blacks).
59. Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 446; see also John B. McConahay, Self-
Interest Versus Racial Attitudes as Correlates of Anti-Busing Attitudes in Louisville:
Is it the Buses or the Blacks?, 44 J. POL. 692, 705-07 (1982) ('The tenets of modern
racism are that discrimination is a thing of the past, blacks are pushing too hard,
they are getting too much attention and sympathy from the nation's elites and that
blacks' gains and demands are no longer justified."); see also David 0. Sears et al.,
Whites Opposition to Busing. Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?, 73 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 369 (1979).
60. See Cardell Jacobson, Resistance to Affirmative Action, 29 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 306 (1985) (finding that both new and old-fashioned racism were
significantly related to attitudes about affirmative action programs).
61. See Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20.
62. See Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38.
63. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43.
64. Compare Jacobson, supra note 60, at 314-15 (describing the seven questions
that comprised the New Racism Scale) with McConahay, supra note 59, at 708.
65. See Jacobson, supra note 60, at 326-27.
Law and Inequality
antagonism. 66 Thus, most studies seem to point toward the idea
that the New Racism Theory works well in combination with other
explanations for White opposition to race-targeted policies, but is
flawed as a complete explanation.
If, as the New Racism Theory posits, attitudes toward social
policy stem from underlying racial antagonisms, then Whites
would oppose not only programs seen as preferential treatment,
but also programs designed to simply help Blacks win jobs (e.g.,
job training programs) or gain access to higher education (e.g.,
scholarships or education programs). But studies have found that
job training and education programs are in fact supported by the
White public.67 Similarly, if the true motivation for opposing
affirmative action is in fact modern racism, then Americans would
oppose affirmative action policies regardless of how survey
questions are phrased or issues are framed. But again, empirical
evidence suggests opinions are influenced significantly by both.68
Given the number of factors which have been shown to influence
the formation of attitudes toward affirmative action policies-from
individuals' beliefs about American values 69 to the way questions
about affirmative action are framed 7 0-it seems inappropriate to
equate attitudes toward a given policy solely with racism.
D. The Self-Interest Theory
The Self-Interest Theory posits that "Americans are unlikely
to support policies from which they do not benefit."71 Americans
tend to resent programs in which the government is perceived as
giving preferences to some groups and not others.72 Therefore, the
Self-Interest Theory is based on an argument of relative
deprivation: people experience feelings of deprivation or
66. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43, at 24 (concluding that racial
resentment plays an important role in White public opinion, but is not the only
thing that matters for race policy); Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 460 (finding
only partial support for the new racism theory); see also Kluegel & Smith, supra
note 20, at 814.
67. See, e.g., Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20, at 797 (finding strong support for
opportunity-enhancing programs).
68. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43; see also Fletcher & Chalmers, supra
note 23 (providing examples of studies that have found significant effect of framing
on attitudes toward affirmative action).
69. See, e.g., Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20.
70. See, e.g., KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43; see also Fletcher & Chalmers,
supra note 23.
71. Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 443.
72. See id. at 445 (citing examples of studies that have found White Americans
often do not support programs seen as benefiting only certain groups).
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resentment when they feel there is a discrepancy between what
they have, what they want, and what they deserve. 73 Self-interest
theorists maintain that resentment stemming from perceived
relative deprivation as a result of affirmative action measures is a
major impediment to widespread public support. 74
Two types of self-interest have been tested with regard to
opposition to race-targeting: (1) individual self-interest, "often
defined narrowly to mean tangible losses or gains to an individual
or his or her immediate family;" and (2) group self-interest,
defined as "identification with a group and a sense of shared
fate... [(e.g.,] Blacks are consistently more supportive of race-
targeted policies than are Whites of comparable socioeconomic
statusD] ."75 In addition, self-interest may be measured by
questions focusing on the relative benefits of a given policy for
individuals or groups (e.g., will Whites benefit from this policy?) 76
or by questions measuring perceived harm of a policy to
individuals or groups. 77
In their study on opposition to race-targeting using a
benefits-oriented definition of self-interest, Bobo and Kluegel
found little support for the individual self-interest interpretation,
but did find support for group self-interest, "[Piart of the reason
for opposition to race-targeted policies is- the sense that race-
targeted policies benefit blacks to the exclusion of problems of
working-class whites. The strongest aspect of group self-interest
seems to be a straightforward calculation by whites that members
of their own group will not benefit."
78
Kinder and Sanders found similar results with their harm-
oriented definition of self-interest. 79 They found that most Whites
perceive affirmative action as "a clear and present danger."8 0 Over
73. See generally FAYE J. CROSBY, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND WORKING
WOMEN 160 (1982) (explaining the theory of relative deprivation as dependent on a
variety of cognitive-emotional factors instead of entirely on one's objectivity).
74. See Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20, at 802.
75. Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 445; see also KINDER & SANDERS, supra
note 43, at 51, 81-84 (generally acknowledging that the line distinguishing group
and individual self-interest is not always clear).
76. See, e.g., Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 445.
77. See, e.g., KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43.
78. Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 459; Jacobson, supra note 60; see also
Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20 (finding support for self-interest as a predictor of
attitudes toward affirmative action programs).
79. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43, at 54 ("Many White Americans
appear convinced that in vital domains of life .... policies and procedures operate
against their own interests and for the interests of Blacks.").
80. Id.
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57% of Whites surveyed agreed that "affirmative action programs
for blacks have reduced whites' chances for jobs, promotions, and
admissions to schools and training programs."81 Almost 75% said
that "it was very or somewhat likely that a white person wouldn't
get a job or a promotion while an equally or less qualified black
person got one instead."8 2  White Americans who believe that
Blacks threaten their collective interests are significantly less
supportive of affirmative action policies. 83
William Julius Wilson, a strong advocate of the Self-Interest
Theory, has argued that race-targeted policies are unlikely to
receive wide support because many people have no stake in
them.8 4 He posits that to improve the life chances of Blacks, the
government must advocate universal programs to which people of
all races can positively relate.85 Such universal programs would
be designed to stimulate the general economy by promoting "wage
and price stability, favorable employment conditions, and the
development and integration of manpower training programs with
educational programs."86
Scholars in virtually every discipline have roundly criticized
the Self-Interest Theory, putting forward ample evidence that
individuals often act out of motivations other than self-interest.8 7
One line of criticism, derived from studies on procedural and
distributive justice, is particularly relevant to the study of race-
targeted affirmative action. Justice theorists8 8 argue that in
evaluating legal and political authorities and institutions,
individuals rely less on self-interested calculations than on
normative criteria of fairness. 89 That is, individuals evaluate
outcomes not only against their personal gain and loss, but also
against a desire to receive fair outcomes, arrived at by using fair
81. Id. at 83.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 84-85.
84. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 118-24 (1987).
85. See id.
86. Id. at 121.
87. See Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the
Explanation of Political Life, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 3 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,
1990) (providing an excellent summary of criticisms of Self-Interest Theory in
disciplines ranging from economics to psychology and its impact on political policy).
88. See Tom R. Tyler, Justice, Self-Interest, and the Legitimacy of Legal and
Political Authority, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 171, 172 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,
1990) (defining justice theorists as scholars who study procedural or distributive
justice under the following assumptions: individuals are motivated by a desire to
receive fair outcomes arrived at by using fair procedures, and individuals evaluate
their outcomes using justice-based criteria).
89. See id. at 172.
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procedures. 90
Empirical evidence in a wide range of contexts supports this
theory. Studies of defendants in misdemeanor courts,91 citizen-
police encounters,92  civil court cases,93  alternative dispute
resolution 94 and the political system 95 have all found that people
are more likely to support authorities if they think that the
procedures used in these experiences are fair. Overall, fairness of
process has a greater effect on individuals' evaluation of these
experiences than whether the outcomes are in their favor.
Research on judging fairness suggests several criteria on
which individuals evaluate fairness. People consider the
authorities' motivation, honesty and ethicality, the quality of the
decisions, opportunities for error correction, and the authorities'
bias.96 Another crucial evaluative criterion is opportunity for
representation. 97 People judge procedures as fair when they
believe they have had an opportunity to participate in the
decision.98  Participation includes having an opportunity to
present one's arguments and have one's views considered.99 Those
who feel they have participated in the decision are much more
likely to accept its outcome, whether the outcome benefits them or
90. See id.
91. See Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants'Evaluations
of Their Courtroom Experiences, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 51 (1984) (concluding that a
major determinant of satisfaction with judges and the courts is the defendant's
perception of fairness).
92. See Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of
Satisfaction with Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 BASIC AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
281, 288 (1980) ("Respondents who felt they were treated fairly by the police had
more positive evaluations of their encounters with the police and of the police in
general than did those who felt unfairly treated, irrespective of whether the police
solved the problem for which they were called.").
93. See generally E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL,
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989)
(finding that personal evaluations of litigants regarding case outcome and delay
were more strongly correlated with perceived fairness and satisfaction than were
objective measures of outcome and delay).
94. See Tom R. Tyler, W/hat is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC'Y. REV. 103, 128 (1988) ("[A]
key determinant of citizen reactions to encounters with legal authorities is the
respondents' assessment of the fairness of the procedures used in that contact.").
95. See Kenneth A. Rasinski & Tom R. Tyler, Fairness and Vote Choice in the
1984 Presidential Election, 16 AM. POL. Q. 5 (stating that procedural fairness is a
better predictor of political evaluations than considerations of distributive justice or
economic outcomes).
96. See Tyler, supra note 94, at 128.
97. See id.
98. See Tyler, supra note 88, at 176.
99. See id.
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not.100 Further, people value the opportunity to present their case
in a less formal way than is often possible in courts.'0 ' Thus, in
civil cases, individuals often regard alternative forms of dispute
resolution, such as mediation, as fairer than courtroom trials,
presumably because informal procedures often offer greater
opportunities for direct participation. 102 Likewise, in criminal
cases, defendants perceive plea bargaining as fairer than going to
trial. 103
Research on procedural fairness thus suggests that, like the
American Values and New Racism Theories, the Self-Interest
Theory is incomplete as an explanation for American attitudes. 0 4
Rather than focusing on the outcomes of decisions or policies (i.e.,
how will this policy affect me or people like me?), individuals who
are affected by third-party decisions in both formal and informal
settings react to the procedural justice of the decisionmaking
process, even if the decision is not in their favor. This suggests
that Americans oppose affirmative action not only because they
receive no benefit, but also because they perceive some groups as
benefiting unfairly.
E. Policy Implications for Affirmative Action
None of these theories can single-handedly explain White
Americans' lack of support for race-targeted policies. That each is
only a partial explanation, however, does not mean that these
theories are not useful in understanding the gap between
American support for principles of racial equality and policies
designed to achieve racial equality. This section looks at the
implications of each theory for future race-targeted policies.
American Values theorists argue that the contest over the
hearts of Americans on issues of race can be seen as a contest
between the two values of individualism and egalitarianism. 0 5
100. See id; see also Tyler, supra note 94, at 128.
101. Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and Outcome&"
Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENV. U. L. REv. 419, 429 (1988).
102. See id.
103. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. &
Soc'v. REv. 483 (finding that the sense of fairness in the criminal proceedings
significantly influenced felons' evaluation of treatment); Jean M. Landis & Lynne
Goodstein, When is Justice Fair?: An Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus
Procedure Debate, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 675 (noting that such a finding adds
support to the theorized role of outcome certainty in influencing perceptions of
outcome fairness).
104. See supra notes 43-57, 58-70 and accompanying text (critiquing the
American Values and New Racism Theories).
105. See supra notes 24-42 and accompanying text (elaborating on the American
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Framing issues in terms of values affects the debate on affirmative
action policies in at least two ways. First, it tends to obscure
underlying issues of resource allocation.106  It is harder, for
example, to discuss the costs of a government policy when an issue
is being framed as one of fundamental equalities ("How can one
put a price on equality?"). It is easier to garner support for a
policy when neither cost nor allocation of resources appears to be
at issue. Second, framing an issue in terms of a basic American
value automatically puts the opposing side on the defensive. 07
The most effective tactic of the anti-affirmative action movement,
for example, has been to usurp the language of equality and merit
for itself, framing affirmative action policies as unfair, unequal
and denying equal opportunities for all.
The American Values Theory suggests that an affirmative
action policy must be framed or justified in terms of fundamental
American values to attract widespread support. 08 Since the late
1960s and 1970s, when the Civil Rights Movement's agenda
turned from issues of formal equality to issues of substantive
equality, the American public has been more receptive to
arguments framed in terms of issues of individualism. 0 9
Recognition that a general need for affirmative action exists for an
entire group does not necessarily mean that the same remedy
should be available to everyone in the group."10 Employees from
the same racial or ethnic group with different levels of education
might require varying forms of training, from none at all to quite a
lot."' It is possible to design (and win support for) affirmative
action policies that are intended to benefit a particular group, but
which offer individual-based remedies." 2
Values Theory).
106. See Paul Gewirtz, The Triumph and Transformation of Antidiscrimination
Law, in RACE, LAW, & CULTURE 110, 117 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997) (arguing that
conceptualizing a social problem as a right or in terms of justice can obscure more
relevant questions of resource allocation).
107. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 593
(1982) (arguing that all arguments in the form of equality place opposing
arguments on the defensive).
108. That it has been difficult to popularize the "diversity" argument for
affirmative action may be attributed in part to the fact that it has not been framed
in terms of traditional American values. See supra notes 24-42 and accompanying
text (discussing the American Values Theory).
109. See Lipset & Schneider, supra note 20, at 43.
110. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination,
and Reasonable Acconimodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 40 (1996) (discussing
individualized versus group-based affirmative action programs).
111. See id.
112. See infra Part III.B. (discussing the use of individual-based remedies in the
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The New Racism Theory suggests that using democratic
principles such as egalitarianism and individualism as
justifications for opposition to race-targeted policies is a mere
pretext; in truth, opposition is based on nothing more than
racism. 113 But studies which have tested this theory find that
while it is true that race targeting does influence White
opinionmaking, White Americans do not necessarily oppose all
race-targeted programs equally." 4 Programs which are framed as
opportunity-enhancing, even if race-targeted, consistently garner
more popular support than programs which are designed to ensure
equal outcomes. 115
Finally, the Self-Interest Theory holds that Americans will
only support policies from which they derive some benefit, and will
resent programs in which the government is perceived as giving
preferences to some groups and not others. 116  It is this
resentment, primarily derived from a sense of relative deprivation,
that impedes the political success of affirmative action laws.
Wilson and other self-interest theorists would argue that one way
to avoid the perception of relative deprivation is to design policies
which have universal appeal rather than policies which are
designed to assist only certain minority groups. " 7 But, under this
theory, all race-targeted policies would be eliminated in favor of a
class-based approach to policymaking. Rather than engaging in
the debate over whether a class- or race-based approach is more
effective," 5 this Article assumes the need for at least some race-
targeted affirmative action and seeks a way of designing race-
based policy capable of garnering public support.
Here the work of justice theorists is helpful. We have seen
evidence that in many cases people are concerned less with
whether or not a policy benefits themselves or a group to which
ADA).
113. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (discussing the New Racism
Theory).
114. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (critiquing the New Racism
Theory).
115. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (critiquing the New Racism
Theory).
116. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Self-Interest
Theory).
117. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (presenting Wilson's
argument for universal policies).
118. For a discussion of why the class-based approach is ineffective as an
alternative to race-targeted affirmative action, see BOWEN AND BOK, supra note 33,
at 46-52 and EDLEY, supra note 11, at 142-59.
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they belong, than they are with procedural fairness. 119 In other
words, if a policy appears to comport with people's overall sense of
fairness, it is more likely to be acceptable regardless of the policy's
beneficiaries. 12
0
Together, these theories suggest four criteria for a politically
successful affirmative action policy. The policy must: (1) be
framed in terms of basic American values; (2) offer individual-
based remedies (even if the program targets a specific group); (3)
be framed as opportunity-enhancing; and (4) emphasize procedural
fairness. To test the viability of these criteria, the next two
sections of this Article will examine their role in the passage of the
most radical and politically successful affirmative action law in
this country-the Americans with Disabilities Act.
II. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Hailed as landmark civil rights legislation, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)121 was signed into law on July 26,
1990, only two years after first being introduced to Congress. 122
By contrast, civil rights bills for racial minorities were introduced
to Congress for over two decades before the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was passed. 123 Arguably the most far-reaching civil rights
legislation ever passed in this country, the ADA departs in many
respects from previous civil rights laws. Most notably, the law
includes what many commentators agree is one of the most
sweeping affirmative action provisions ever enacted by the federal
government, 124  applying to potentially forty-three million
119. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (citing studies which have
demonstrated the role of procedural fairness in evaluations of policies and
programs).
120. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria by
which people evaluate fairness).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
122. The first ADA bill was drafted by thirteen politically conservative members
of an unnoted federal council appointed by President Ronald Reagan and
introduced in the closing days of the 100th Congress in 1988 to almost universal
disregard. See JOSEPH SHAPIRO, No PITY 108, 114 (1993). Patrisha Wright, a
savvy, politically-minded tactician, then rewrote the ADA with the assistance of
Tom Harkin of Iowa and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. See id. at 114.
Harkin and Kennedy then reintroduced the bill in the 101st Congress. After bills
in both houses of Congress survived an impressive gamut of congressional
committee markups and hearings, the House approved the final version of the bill
by a vote of 377 to 28 on July 12, 1990. See 136 CONG. REC. H4629. The Senate
followed suit on July 13, 1990, by an overwhelmingly lopsided vote of 91 to 6. See
136 CONG. REc. S9695.
123. The first equal employment opportunities bill was introduced to Congress in
1942. See BURSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5.
124. See, e.g., CHARLES LAWRENCE III AND MARI MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go
20001
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Americans, or close to one-fifth of the United States. 25 This
section explores the significance of the ADA as a civil rights
measure, with particular attention to its impact as an affirmative
action law.
A. The Substance of the ADA
The ADA was designed to extend civil rights protections
similar to those found in laws prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, age, and religion to
individuals with disabilities. 126 Modeled heavily after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, the law's purpose was to guarantee equal opportunity for the
disabled 2 7 with respect to employment, transportation, public
accommodations, state and local government services and
telecommunications. 128
Title I of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in all
employment practices, including job application procedures,
hiring, firing, compensation, advancement, and other terms and
conditions of employment. 129 To be covered under the ADA, a
disabled person must be "qualified," defined as meeting the
requirements of the position and able to perform the "essential
functions" of the position with or without "reasonable
accommodations."' 130  A "reasonable accommodation" is any
BACK-MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 108 (1997) (calling the ADA
the most radical affirmative action program in U.S. history); see also Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 110, at 14 (discussing the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision as an affirmative action provision).
125. See SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 7 (noting that estimates of the number of
disabled Americans range from 35 to 43 million).
126. For an excellent discussion of the origins of the ADA, see Robert L.
Burgdorf Jr., The Anmericans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991).
127. Under the ADA, an individual is considered "disabled" if he or she: (1) is
substantially impaired with respect to a major life activity; (2) has a record of such
impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. In addition, the
ADA protects people who are discriminated against because they know, are
associated with, or are related to a disabled individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(1994).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994).
129. The ADA applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees, including
private employers, state and local governments, educational institutions,
employment agencies, and labor organizations. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(2), (5)
(1994).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). The Supreme Court has stated that an inquiry
into whether an individual is "qualified" involves an individualized assessment into
whether the particular individual can perform the essential functions of the job
despite his or her disability, and, if he or she cannot perform essential functions,
whether a reasonable accommodation would enable the individual to do so. See
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modification or adjustment to the work environment that will
enable a qualified disabled individual to perform the essential job
functions. 131 Such accommodations include, but are not limited to,
acquiring or modifying equipment or devices, job restructuring,
providing part-time or modified work schedules, adjusting or
modifying examinations, training materials or policies and
providing readers and interpreters. 132
B. The ADA as a Departure from Past Civil Rights Laws
The central tenets of the ADA are taken from Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, to a lesser extent, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.133 The cornerstone of employment discrimination law,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
"because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."13, It
does not protect against discrimination based on disability.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of - 1973 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability by programs receiving
federal financial assistance. 135 Section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act requires that any contract with the federal government in
excess of $10,000 contain a provision that "the party contracting
with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and
advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities."'136
While the ADA is based on Title VII and Section 503, it
nevertheless departs from both laws in ways that represent
landmark changes for civil rights law. The most striking
departure is the ADA's reconceptualization of the definition of
School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 275, 288 (1987). The ADA
includes a number of "loopholes" for employers. For example, despite the
requirement to provide reasonable accommodations, an employer is not required to
provide a reasonable accommodation that would pose an "undue hardship" on the
business, defined as an "action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when
considered in light of other factors such as the cost of accommodation in relation to
the resources of the employer, or whether the accommodation would alter the
nature or operation of the business. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994). Employers also
need not hire individuals who pose a "direct threat" to the health and safety of
others. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(b), 12111(3) (1994).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
132. See id.
133. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 110, at 5-8 (discussing the statutory
origins of the ADA).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is but
one title of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act. Other titles concern access to
public facilities, voting rights, education, and discrimination in federally assisted
programs.
135. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794 (1994).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1994) (amended 1992).
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discrimination itself. Title VII defines discrimination in a
negative sense: "employment practices are unlawful only if they
prevent individuals from doing the job as the employer defines
it."137 Thus plaintiffs under Title VII can complain about
discrimination against them but cannot insist upon discrimination
in their favor. 18 By contrast, plaintiffs under the ADA can
complain about discrimination if their employers do not take their
disabilities into account. 13 9
Second, the ADA incorporates an affirmative action provision
into the basic requirements of the Act. 40 Nothing of this kind
exists under Title VII. While the ADA does not require the
employer to give a disabled applicant or employee any preferential
treatment over other applicants or employees, the reasonable
accommodation provision fits most general definitions of
affirmative action' 4 ' because it requires employers to take account
of an individual's disabilities and to provide special treatment for
that reason. 42  The Rehabilitation Act contains a similar
affirmative action provision, but applies only to federal
contractors.143 The ADA applies to virtually all private businesses
regardless of whether they do business with the U.S.
government. 44
Third, the ADA costs businesses money. Title VII merely
requires businesses to change their practices; the ADA requires
businesses to pay for accommodations for disabled employees to
avoid being discriminatory. The Rehabilitation Act has a similar
provision for federal contractors, but provides federal money for
137. Karlan & Rutherglen, supro note 110, at 9.
138. See id. at 3.
139. See id.
140. This Article maintains that the reasonable accommodation provisions of the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5), constitute a form of affirmative action in that they
require an employer to take account of an individuars disability and to provide
special treatment to him or her on the basis of that disability. See Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 110, at 14 (suggesting a similar interpretation of the
reasonable accommodation provision).
141. See EDLEY, supra note 11, at 16-17 (defining affirmative action as "any
effort taken to expand opportunity for [minorities] by using membership in those
groups that have been subject to discrimination as a consideration [in
decisionmaking or allocation of resources]").
142. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 110, at 14.
143. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires "affirmative action" by federal
agencies and contractors with respect to employment. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794
(1994).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2),(5)(1994) (defining "covered entity" and
"employer").
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those businesses which comply. 145 The ADA provides no such
reimbursement for private businesses.
Finally, the ADA operates under the assumption that
existing jobs can be modified to enable more individuals to perform
them. It asks the employer, in other words, to accommodate the
job to the individual, rather than demand that the individual
accommodate himself or herself to the job. 146 Jobs under the ADA
are conceptualized less as rigid job descriptions and more as
"contingent assemblies of tasks and responsibilities that can be
changed to accommodate the needs of individual employees." 147
No such assumptions exist under any other civil rights law.
III. Analysis of the ADA as a Politically Successful
Affirmative Action Measure
In a government that is both predisposed to recycling old
policy ideas 148 and increasingly opposed to affirmative action, one
wonders how the ADA could have been enacted so successfully.
Section I of this Article proposed four hypotheses for what a
politically successful affirmative action law must look like: (1) it
must be framed in terms of basic American values; (2) it must offer
individual-based remedies; (3) it must be framed as opportunity-
enhancing; and (4) it must comport with normative criteria on
fairness. 149 This section tests the viability of these hypotheses by
examining their role in the passage of the ADA. Specifically, this
section examines the Congressional Record, transcripts from
congressional hearings, and the mass media coverage of the floor
debate on the ADA to identify how legislators framed the debate
on the ADA, and how they identified, discussed and resolved the
major issues on reasonable accommodation.
145. See 29 U.S.C. § 791, 793 (1994) (providing that the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 requires, as a condition of receipt of federal funds, that federal contractors,
programs and agencies comply with the discrimination provisions of the Act).
146. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 110, at 39.
147. Id.
148. Paul Burstein and Nelson Polsby have observed that policymakers are
rarely innovative in their approach to legislating. See BURSTEIN, supra note 2, at
38; see also NELSON W. POLSBY, POLITICAL INNOVATION IN AMERICA 112 (1984)
("The amount of recycling we have seen-in which proposals are made, defeated,
and reemerge later on... suggests that at any point in history there is a limited
stock of ideas that provide an agenda for policymakers").
149. See supra Part I.E. (extracting from the American Values, New Racism and
Self-Interest Theories those criteria required for a politically successful affirmative
action policy).
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A. The American Values Hypothesis
Under the American Values hypothesis, a politically
successful affirmative action law must appeal to traditional
American principles of egalitarianism andlor individualism. 150
Overwhelmingly, the bills in both houses of Congress were framed
in the language of the early Civil Rights Movement, relying on
dependable buzzwords of that era: "equal opportunity," "equal
access," and "a level playing field." The vast majority of floor
statements, regardless of the speaker's political ideology, made
some reference to American values, history, and justice:
Harkin (D - IA): The American dream is the dream of
opportunity for all. And when any American is denied the
opportunity to contribute, we all lose. When we free the
talents and ability of millions of Americans with disabilities,
we all win.151
Armey (R - TX): The intent of all civil rights legislation is to
provide equal opportunities and a level playing field for
everyone. The ADA intends to extend these protections to the
disabled, and I fully support that intent. 152
Durenberger (R - MN): [This bill] is a statement of our social
values. 153
Hoyer (D - MD): American history and justice have been
founded on the principle that all Americans regardless of race,
sex, age, ethnicity or any other factor are created equal. The
principle assumes that society will do what is necessary and
possible to ensure that equality of opportunity. 154
That the framing of the ADA as an American values bill was
an effective political strategy can be measured by its effect on
opposition to the bill. Commentators have argued that framing an
issue in terms of American values automatically puts any opposing
argument on the defensive and obscures issues of resource
allocation that may be relevant to the debate.155 Opponents of the
bill generally, and of the reasonable accommodation provision in
particular, could not successfully argue the issue of whether the
disabled ought to be accommodated. That issue, with only one
exception, was never contested. 156 As Richard Cohen observed in
150. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the American Values Theory).
151. 135 CONG. REC. 19,800 (1989).
152. 136 CONG. REC. 10,878 (1990).
153. 135 CONG. REC. 19,810 (1989).
154. 136 CONG. REc. 10,856 (1990).
155. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text (discussing the American
Values Theory).
156. See 135 CONG. REC. 21,741 (1989) (Senator Garn, a disabled man himself,
explained why he voted against the ADA- "How then is the goal to eliminate
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the National Journal: "The limited opposition to the bill can be
explained partly by its label as a civil rights measure.... Few
lawmakers want to oppose a bill that seemingly has the appeal of
apple pie and bears little cost to the federal government."'157
Rather than contesting the principle of accommodation for
the disabled, the debate centered predominately on the language
of the reasonable accommodation provision-opponents found the
language far too vague-and on the issue of who should bear the
cost of the accommodations:
McCollum (R - FL): The big debate over this bill has never
been over the issue of providing civil rights and
antidiscrimination laws to protect our disabled community in
the workplace. The big issue is how do we minimize the costs
to the employer while still doing that?1 58
Delay (R - TX): Mandating access for the disabled may be a
reasonable requirement. Mandating that a business spend
money to provide that access is something different. But to
leave the spending mandate open-ended-with the courts
determining how much small businesses must spend to
accommodate the disabled-is unheard of.159
John Motley: Nat? Federation of Independent Business: Many
in the disability community view the ADA bill as a declaration
of their independence .... But there exists a fundamental
difference between statutes for other groups and the ADA
bill-namely, as currently written, access for the disabled
comes at the expense of others. Under past civil rights laws,
businesses were required to "open their doors" to the various
minority groups. The ADA would do the same for the
disabled. However, in addition to opening the doors,
businesses will be required to spend their own money to make
alterations to those doorways and make other
accommodations. 160
Those who opposed the ADA found themselves in the
unsavory position of attempting to raise the issue of costs during a
discrimination against the disabled to be accomplished? The true answer is to be
found within individuals-not the government.... There is a second consideration
and that is the importance of the disabled person to take responsibility for himself
or herself.").
157. Richard Cohen, It Sounds Great, But IWat's It Mean?, NAVL J., Sept. 16,
1989 in U.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 101-336: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT 2256 (1989) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; see also Editorial, Blank
Check for the Disabled?, N.Y. TIMES, September 6, 1989, at A24, in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra at 2255 (stating that "No politician can vote against this bill and
survive.").
158. 136 CONG. REC. 10,872 (1990).
159. 136 CONG. REC. 10,419 (1990).
160. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 157, at 1909 (statement of John Motley,
National Federation of Independent Business).
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debate that centered largely on the more "compelling" issues of
freedom and equality. Recognizing the power of American values
rhetoric, some legislators and business groups who testified during
congressional hearings attempted to frame the issue of cost in
terms of American values as well. In particular, they
characterized the issue as one of fairness and equal rights:
Armey (R - TX): [T]he ADA as currently written may do far
more than assure equal access.... We should be careful that
in protecting one group of Americans we do not forget the
rights of others. 161
DeLay (R - TX): This bill has a laudable goal, but it lacks
fairness. We are pitting one group of Americans against
another group of Americans. 162
Despite these attempts, the debate on the costs of
implementing the ADA for private businesses was limited.
Estimates of both the costs and the benefits were so speculative
during the course of the debates, one New York Times editorial
scathingly remarked: "No one wishes to stint on helping the
disabled. It requires little legislative skill, however, to write blank
checks for worthy causes with other people's money." 163
Supporters of the ADA responded to the cost argument with a
skillful combination of cost-benefit analysis and American values
rhetoric. They typically referred to unemployment statistics for
the disabled,164 together with estimates of the cost of such
unemployment to the government in both welfare payments and
lost productivity. 165 They then made reference to a 1986 Harris
poll which found that 66% of disabled, unemployed Americans
would like to be working, 66 cited a wide range of loose estimates
for what the ADA might cost, and then concluded that the ADA
will turn out to save America money. 67 The argument of cost was
then returned to the rhetoric of American values:
161. 136 CONG. REC. 10,879 (1990).
162. 136 CONG. REC. 10,419 (1990).
163. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 157, at 2255.
164. A 1986 Harris poll found that two-thirds of all disabled Americans between
the ages of 16 and 64 were not working. See INT'L CENTER FOR THE DISABLED, THE
ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE
MAINSTREAM 47 (1986) [hereinafter ICD]. At the time of the survey, only one in
four worked full time, and another 10% worked part-time. See id. at 49. No other
demographic group under 65 had such high unemployment, including young
Blacks. See id. at 47.
165. Some estimates of the cost of disability to the U.S. pocketbook are as high
as $170 billion a year. SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 28.
166. See ICD, supra note 164, at 50.
167. See 135 CONG. REC. 19,800 (1989) (testimony of Senator Harkin, who
introduced the bill to the Senate on September 7, 1989).
[Vol. 18:85
2000] REASONABLYACCOMMODATING RACE 111
Jeffords (R - VT): [The ADA's] effects should not be judged in
terms of cost, but rather realized potential. 168
Conte (R - MA): The investment [the ADA] represents will
yield tremendous outcomes by allowing millions of American
citizens to work, compete, and contribute to our country in
ways they never have before. 169
Sponsors and supporters of the ADA included a broad array
of Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives. The
coalition which so successfully pushed the ADA through Congress
utilized a relatively conservative technique to pass a remarkable
new civil rights law: it appealed to traditional notions of self-help,
self-empowerment, investment in human capital, and equal
opportunity for all.170 By framing the debate of the ADA in these
terms, legislators were able to avoid any sustained discussion
about what the law might cost. It is evident, then, that the
rhetoric of American values continues to be a highly effective and
influential method of framing a potentially contentious issue.
B. The Individual-Based Remedy Hypothesis
Evidence on American attitudes toward affirmative action
suggest that Americans do not approve of remedies to persistent
inequality that grant rewards on the basis of group membership
rather than individual merit. 17' A successful affirmative action
measure will necessarily have to contain, then, an individual-
based remedy.
The issue of an individual-based remedy in the ADA arose in
the context of a debate on vagueness: how much detail should the
specific provisions regarding reasonable accommodation contain?
Many legislators and businesses argued that the law as it was
drafted was far too vague to lend any guidance to employers who
were attempting to provide accommodations for the disabled.172
They argued that by leaving vague definitions to the courts'
discretion, legislators were abdicating their duties to write law
effectively. 173 Supporters of the ADA, however, insisted that broad
168. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 157, at 948.
169. 136 CONG. REc. 10,860 (1990).
170. See SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 121 (discussing disability rights activists'
strategy of using a conservative self-help/independence argument to win support
for the ADA).
171. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text (presenting research which has
demonstrated an American aversion to group-based remedies).
172. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 157, at 1594, 1657, 1908 (statements
by the Associated Builders and Contractors, Associated General Contractors of
America and the National Federation of Independent Businesses respectively).
173. See 136 CONG. REC. 10,419, 10,903 (1990) (statements by Congressmen
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definitions provided employers and courts with the flexibility to
resolve accommodation issues on a case-by-case basis. 174 They
stressed the importance of adapting each individual's work
environment to his or her specific disability, and of determining
what kind of accommodation may be reasonable in light of the
financial resources of a particular employer. 175
Whereas the beneficiaries of traditional affirmative action
programs typically receive special treatment by virtue of their
group status as a "protected class" (however that may be defined),
under the ADA, disabled individuals must not only be "qualified"
to perform a given job, 176 but the treatment itself must be designed
to address the individual's particular disability and the employer
must be able to reasonably provide the accommodation. 177 The
ADA thus manages to target a group of disadvantaged minorities,
while simultaneously providing individualized remedies for
members of that group.
C. The Opportunity-Enhancing Hypothesis
Research has found that Americans favor affirmative action
programs when they are framed as opportunity-enhancing rather
DeLay and Olin).
174. A number of congressional reports declared that reasonable accommodation
involves a fact-specific, case-by-case approach intended to take account of the needs
of the individual as well as the requirements of the job. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO.
101-485, 101", Cong., pt. 2, at 62 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 344-
45.
175. The idea that employers must change the work environment to conform to
the specific needs of a disabled employee is a radical new innovation in public
policy, one that grew out of the disabled movement. In the past, disability was
considered a medical defect which was located in the individual. See Harlan Hahn,
Civil Rights for Disabled Americans: The Foundation of a Political Agenda, in
IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds.,
(1987)) [hereinafter Hahn, Civil Rights] Policy changes were considered
unnecessary because the emphasis at that time was improving the functional
capabilities of individuals. See id. Since the 1970s, a more sociopolitical approach
toward disability has developed that looks at disability as the product of the
interaction between an individual and his or her environment. See id. at 182; see
also Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and
Discrimination, 44 J. OF SocIAL IssuES 39 (1988). Under this approach, all aspects
of society-architecture, communication, social institutions-are shaped by public
policy. See id. at 40. Structures are built, for example, because laws and
regulations permit them to be constructed in a certain manner. Once the
environment is perceived as a product of public policy rather than as fixed or
immutable, then it may be altered to meet the needs of a wide range of people. See
Hahn, Civil Rights, supra, at 192.
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (1994).
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than results-oriented programs. 178  While the floor debate
contained countless references to the ADA as an extension of the
civil rights granted to other minorities and women under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,179 the emphasis in the debate was less about
equality per se, than it was about equal opportunities and self-
sufficiency:
Riegle (D - MI): Since the days of its inception this Nation has
encouraged and valued independence and self-sufficiency.
There is no better expression of these values than the ADA. 180
Harkin (D - IA): The ADA gives power to individuals with
disabilities to make choices, to decide for themselves what
kind of life they want to lead, and promotes a meaningful and
effective opportunity to become independent and productive
members of our society. 18 '
Owens (D - NY): The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
is an opportunity bill which will provide parallel protection for
people with disabilities as have long existed for other minority
groups and women.18 2
Bennett (D - FL): The ADA removes the hurdles and opens the
door-the door to opportunity.183
There is considerable evidence that suggests that framing the
ADA as opportunity enhancing was a deliberate attempt to move
away from any characterization of the ADA as an affirmative
action measure. Legislators on both sides of the political spectrum
clearly did not want to be seen as promoting special preferences.
Despite the fact that special preferences and afrmative action
were in no way at issue during the floor debates, legislators made
frequent, unsolicited remarks intended to clarify in what ways the
ADA is not a special preference law:
Hoyer (D - MD): This bill does not guarantee a job--or
anything else. It guarantees a level playing field.'8 4
Edwards (D - CA): [T]he ADA does not require an employer to
hire unqualified persons, nor does it require employers to give
178. See, e.g., Kluegel & Smith, supra note 20, at 797; see also Bobo & Kluegel,
supra note 38, at 446.
179. See 136 CONG. REc. 10,857 (1990) (reporting Rep. Owens' statement that
"[tihe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is an opportunity bill which will
provide parallel protection for people with disabilities as have long existed for other
minority groups and women."); see also 136 CONG. REC. 10,878 (1990) (reporting
Rep. Armey's statement that "the intent of all civil rights legislation is to provide
equal opportunities and a level playing field for everyone. The ADA intends to
extend those protections to the disabled.").
180. 135 CONG. REC. 19,891 (1989).
181. 135 CONG. REC. 19,803 (1989).
182. 136 CONG. REC. 10,857 (1990).
183. 136 CONG. REC. 10,611 (1990).
184. 136 CONG. REC. 10,856 (1990).
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preference to persons with disabilities. The ADA simply states
that a person's disability should not be an adverse factor in
the employment process. 185
Hatch (R - Utah): Persons with disabilities I have talked to
stress that their entire desire is only to be given the same
opportunity to work and fend for themselves like anyone else.
They are looking for what this bill provides-equal
opportunity, not equal results. 8 6
Jeffords (R - VT): [The ADA'sj effects should.., not be
measured in terms of effort, but in increased productivity; and
not be characterized as preferential treatment, but as
reaffirmed human dignity. 187
Absolutely no mention is made of the reasonable
accommodations provision in the context of affirmative action. No
legislator during floor debates on opportunities for the disabled
made reference to the fact that the bill requires that employers
spend additional resources on the disabled so that they may
realize opportunities in the marketplace. It is not true, as Rep.
Edwards from California suggested, that the ADA "simply states
that a person's disability should not be an adverse factor in the
employment process."'8 8  The ADA specifically mandates that
employers take employees' disabilities into account and provide a
reasonable accommodation to ensure their equal participation in
the workplace.18 9
That legislators were uncomfortable promoting a law with
affirmative action attributes, even when framed as opportunity
enhancing, can be seen in the way they bent over backwards to
characterize the ADA as "just another civil rights law." Whereas
opposition to the ADA consistently attempted to portray the ADA
as a "radical" new civil rights law, 190 legislators who supported the
ADA tended to downplay its significant departures from
traditional civil rights laws by repeatedly making reference to the
ways in which the ADA was based on traditional American values
and "tried and tested" civil rights laws like the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.191 Thus, while the
185. 136 CONG. REc. 10,868 (1990).
186. 135 CONG. REC. 19,804 (1989).
187. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 157, at 948.
188. 136 CONG. REC. 10,868 (1990).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (1994) (defining as discriminatory any situation
in which employers do not make reasonable accommodations).
190. See 135 CONG. REc. 19,881 (1989) (reporting Senator Humphrey's reference
to the ADA as "one of the most radical pieces of legislation I have encountered in
my eleven years in the Senate.").
191. See 135 CONG. REC. 19,800 (1989) (reporting Senator Harkin's statement
that "[i]n seeking passage of the ADA, we are not asking for an uncertain venture
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reasonable accommodation provision is in fact opportunity-
enhancing-i.e., it assists disabled workers to become more
productive members of the workforce-legislators seemed
reluctant to talk about the provision beyond values rhetoric, and
indeed went to great lengths to avoid the appearance of supporting
an affirmative action law.
D. The Procedural Fairness Hypothesis
The procedural fairness hypothesis states that a politically
successful affirmative action law will comport with Americans'
overall sense of procedural fairness. 192 One criterion by which
Americans evaluate fairness is participation: people judge
procedures as fair when they believe they have had an opportunity
to participate in the decision.1 93
The ADA's reasonable accommodation provision is structured
to maximize this type of participation. Both the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee and the House Education and Labor
Committee suggest steps for arriving at an appropriate reasonable
accommodation in any given set of circumstances. Reports from
both of these committees state that employers should consult with
the disabled individual in deciding the appropriate
accommodation. 9 4 When the preliminary consultations between
the employer and the employee or applicant are insufficient to
identify a reasonable accommodation, the reports suggest further
steps for identifying and assessing the reasonableness of possible
accommodations. 195 All told, the ADA requires a level of
negotiation and cooperation between employer and employee or
applicant that is far more interactive than that involved under any
other civil rights statute.
It appears that this combination of individual-based remedies
and participatory procedures for obtaining these remedies may be
a politically appealing compromise in a society that views class-
into uncharted waters. We are demanding a return to the tried and tested values
that have guided our Nation for two centuries."); see also 136 CONG. REC. 10,857
(1990) (reporting Rep. Owens's statement that the fundamental concepts of the
ADA bill were not new, but were derived from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
192. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (deriving the Procedural
Fairness hypothesis).
193. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria by
which people judge procedures as fair).
194. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34-35 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
22, at 66 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 348-49.
195. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34-35 (1989).
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based remedies as inherently unfair. In the case of the ADA, the
provisions delineating a process whereby all parties agree to a
reasonable accommodation were precisely what appealed to
legislators and lobbyists as a fair compromise between the
interests of the disabled and the business community. Arlene B.
Mayerson, who testified before the Committee on Education and
Labor on behalf of the Disability Rights Education & Defense
Fund, stated: "[r]easonable accommodation is a flexible standard
that balances the rights of the applicant or employee with the
employer's legitimate business interests."'196 Congressman Weiss,
like many legislators, echoed those sentiments: "The ADA is a
reasonable and prudent bill that strikes a balance between civil
rights of people with disabilities and the legitimate concerns of
both large and small businesses."'197
IV. Implications of the ADA for Race Targetted Affirmative
Action Policy
As an affirmative action policy, the ADA cures much of what
is lacking in current race-targeted policies. Congress not only
framed the ADA as an issue of American values, but it devised a
law which offered individualized, opportunity-enhancing remedies
that comport with normative criteria for procedural fairness. The
question of how the ADA's successes may be adapted to the context
of race-targeted policy, however, still remains. Several arguments
suggest that disabled Americans face such unique forms of
discrimination that there is no adequate analogue in the
circumstances of racial and ethnic minorities. This section tests
the validity of these criticisms and presents some ideas for
applying an ADA model to race-based policy initiatives.
A. Arguments Against Adapting an ADA Model to the
Context of Race
First, one may argue that American attitudes toward the
disabled are significantly different from attitudes toward racial
and ethnic minorities. Commentators have observed, for example,
that prejudice toward the disabled is more subtle than overt racial
bigotry. 98 Disabilities are usually regarded as signs of weakness,
helplessness and biological inferiority. They inspire pity, not
196. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 157, at 1626.
197. 136 CONG. REC. 10,875 (1990).
198. See, e.g., Hahn, Civil Rights, supra note 175, at 197.
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malevolent intolerance. 199 This argument would suggest that
support for the ADA may well have been based on a sense of
paternalism or charity toward the disabled, attitudes which are
less likely to inspire support for race-targeted legislation.200
A review of the Congressional Record, however, shows that
legislators during the floor debate emphasized "self-help" rather
than paternalism, stressing the importance of helping disabled
Americans to become active participants in American economic
and social life, and avoiding any suggestion of victimization.20 1
The emphasis on self-empowerment is consistent with accounts-
most notably Shapiro's aptly titled book No Pity202--of a thriving
new self-identity among members of the growing disability
movement. 203 Shapiro describes a movement whose core is rooted
in the idea that disability is neither tragic nor pitiable, but a
source of pride and a fundamental part of one's identity. 20 4 In
lobbying for the ADA, the disability movement's leaders relied on
an explicitly conservative argument that played off the
movement's new self-image: disabled people wanted independence,
jobs, and self-empowerment, not a paternalistic government
handing them welfare checks.20 5 The tenor of the congressional
debates on the ADA echoed these themes.
A second argument for distinguishing the ADA from race-
targeted policy emphasizes the unique barriers facing the
disabled. While disabled individuals may well face invidious or
structural discrimination in the labor market, they also face
199. See id.
200. See SNIDERMAN & CARMINEs, supra note 5, at 1-14 (arguing that the
"charitable" impulse of White liberals at one time transformed the politics of race,
but that the era of affirmative action has fundamentally changed racial politics).
201. See supra notes 170, 180-181 and accompanying text (providing examples of
an emphasis during congressional debates on self-help and self-sufficiency).
202. See SHAPIRO, supra note 122.
203. A Louis Harris & Associates survey conducted for the International Center
for the Disabled (ICD) in 1986 found clear signs of an emerging group
consciousness among disabled people. See ICD, supra note 164, at 9-10. The
survey found that 74% of all disabled Americans felt at least some sense of common
identity with other disabled people. Almost half felt that disabled people are a
minority group in the same sense as are Blacks and Hispanics. Almost 75% felt
that anti-discrimination laws that protect minorities should also protect disabled
people. See id.
204. See SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 20. In his discussion of the growing
disability movement, Shapiro points to traditional signs of a new and thriving
group identity: the reappropriation of traditionally demeaning language ("crips")-
similar to the appropriation of words like "fag" and "dyke" in the gay and lesbian
community-and the fight against demeaning and paternalistic imagery in the
mass media. See id. at 30-40.
205. See id. at 120-21.
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physical barriers to labor market participation which the
reasonable accommodation provision is intended to redress. A
wheelchair-bound individual cannot work, for example, if he or she
cannot get up a set of stairs. By contrast, barriers for racial
minorities involve more complex forms of discrimination which
cannot be remedied by simply providing a ramp or widening
doorways.
This Article does not suggest that remedies to racial
discrimination are as simple as, or analogous to, remedies such as
the reasonable accommodation provision. Rather, the case of the
ADA's reasonable accommodation provision is used as an
illustration of those characteristics of affirmative action policy
which have proven politically feasible. The next section posits that
it is not the specific forms of accommodations (e.g., ramps,
doorways) which are useful for race-targeted affirmative action.
Rather, it is the underlying assumption of the ADA's affirmative
action provision-that the state, employers, and employees can
devise innovative solutions for maximizing the ability of
individuals to become productive workers-that may be applicable
to the context of race.
Third, one may argue that the disabled differ from racial
minorities because, unlike ascriptive social classifications such as
race, Americans can become disabled at any time. In fact, fewer
than 15% of current disabled Americans were born with their
disabilities. 206 The ADA may appeal to many as a type of future
insurance, that is, even if individuals are not disabled now, they
may one day be so. Indeed, legislators repeatedly cited in their
floor statements aggressive estimates of the number of disabled
people in the United States-43 million disabled Americans or
close to one-fifth of the U.S. population. 207 Many legislators told
stories of their own disabilities or those of family members or
friends, personalizing the problem of disability discrimination,
bringing it "home," framing disability as an issue which touches
most of our lives. 20° It is hard to imagine how, in a society that
increasingly believes racism is no longer a problem, legislators
206. See id. at 7.
207. The ADA itself notes that 43 million Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). Other estimates are
closer to 35 million. See also SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 6.
208. See Barbara M. Altman & Sharon N. Barnartt, Moral Entrepreneurship and
the Promise of the ADA, 4 J. OF DISABILITY POL. STUDIES 21, 28 (1993) (noting that
Senators Tom Harkin, Edward Kennedy, Robert Dole and Daniel Inouye, as well as
Representative Tony Coehlo all either have a family member with a disability or
have a disability themselves).
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could ever successfully "spin" legislation for racial minorities in
the same way.
It may well be true that there are aspects of the "spin" given
to the ADA which could never be applied to the context of race-
based policy. However, the wealth of social science literature on
racial attitudes suggests that there are, in fact, effective strategies
for framing race-targeted policies that parallel the theme of
universality used in the context of the ADA. There is evidence, for
example, that Whites are more likely to support job training
programs for Blacks if the policy argument is made on grounds
that are universal, applying equally to Blacks and Whites (e.g.,
"because the government ought to help people who are out of work
and want to find a job") than if the justification is race-targeted
(e.g., "because of the historic injustices Blacks have suffered").2°9
Thus it would seem that framing policies in a way that emphasizes
universality-even when the policies are in actuality aimed at a
specific group-may be an effective strategy in race-targeted
policymaking.
Finally, the idea that a politically successful affirmative
action policy must offer individualized, opportunity-enhancing
remedies appears to fly in the face of the current goals and
strategies of the Civil Rights Movement. The Civil Rights
Movement and government agencies like the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission turned to race-targeted affirmative
action measures only after it became clear that removing legal
barriers to equal opportunity was not enough to improve the
status of minorities in this country. Similarly, group-based
remedies were specifically chosen to redress what many perceive
to be a group injury: individuals are not harmed by race
discrimination because they are individuals but because they are
members of a racial minority. Thus, to design an affirmative
action policy with individual remedies and an emphasis on
opportunity rather than results, would appear to shift the civil
rights agenda backwards by about twenty-five years.
It is counterproductive to conceive of affirmative action as an
all-or-nothing contest: either egalitarian or individualist, either
group-based or individual-based. The ADA represents an
alternative vision whereby elements of each of these approaches
are contained in a single policy. The ADA is individualist in its
209. SNIDERMAN & CARMINES, supra note 5, at 121 (describing the results of two
surveys concerning race-targeted policy and universal job training policy); see also
Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 460 (finding greater support for race-targeted
opportunity.enhancing policies than race-targeted equal outcome policies).
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emphasis on equal opportunity rather than equal results. 210 It is
egalitarian in that it does more than prohibit formal
discrimination as other civil rights laws do; it requires employers
to spend money to accommodate disabled employees so that they
may compete effectively in the marketplace. 211 In other words, the
ADA speaks not only of employment opportunities, but meaningful
employment opportunities. Likewise, the ADA is group-based in
that it specifically targets the disabled community.2 1 2  It is
individual-based in that mere status as a disabled person alone
does not determine whether one will receive the benefit of the
ADA's reasonable accommodation provision; nor does it determine
what kind of accommodation one is entitled to receive. 213 It is
therefore entirely possible to draft affirmative action laws which
are both consistent with a more aggressive civil rights agenda, and
formulated to win popular support.
B. Application of an ADA Model to the Context of Race-
Targeted Affirmative Action
After the successful passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964,
civil rights advocates turned their attention to a critique of formal
equality and to the remedial possibilities of affirmative action.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, one of the first outspoken
proponents of affirmative action at the federal level, captured the
essence of the criticisms of colorblind policies in his now famous
1965 Howard University speech:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been
hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up
to the starting line of a race and then say, "you
are free to compete with all the others," and still
justly believe that you have been completely
fair .... [i]t is not enough just to open the gates
of opportunity. All of our citizens must have the
ability to walk through those gates.2 14
While the affirmative action policies which have evolved
210. See supra notes 179-191 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA as an
opportunity-enhancing law).
211. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text (discussing how the ADA is
in many ways more egalitarian than other civil rights laws).
212. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
the ADA as a disability rights law).
213. See supra notes 171-177 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA's
individual-based remedies).
214. LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE
POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 126 (1967).
[Vol. 18:85
2000] REASONABLYACCOMMODATING RACE 121
since the 1960s have proven remarkably unpopular among the
American public, 215  the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision manages to successfully capture the spirit of affirmative
action while sustaining popular support. This section considers
how to design race-targeted policies that achieve a similar balance.
To begin, we must recognize that embedded in the issue of
race discrimination are a number of problems which call for
different courses of action. 216 Redressing disparities in income and
wealth between middle class Blacks and Whites does not, for
example, require the same remedy as decreasing unemployment
rates or increasing education and skill levels among the poor. For
the limited purpose of illustration, this section focuses on the
application of an ADA model to policies designed to remove
barriers to the free flow of information regarding job opportunities
and to policies intended to rectify competitive disadvantages in the
labor market for minorities due to inadequate skill formation.
217
Secondly, to argue that the ADA's affirmative action
provision should serve as a model for race-based policy is not to
suggest that Title VII should be amended in ways that parallel the
ADA. The ADA's approach to reasonable accommodation is
premised on a conception of discrimination that fundamentally
differs from that found in Title VII.218 To change the definition of
race discrimination after forty years of "colorblind" jurisprudence
is probably neither politically nor socially feasible. Rather than
viewing reasonable accommodation in the context of race as a
right, one can conceive of the reasonable accommodation provision
as a heuristic device useful for generating creative solutions for
maximizing the ability of minorities to become productive workers.
1. Access to Information
Obstacles to the free flow of information about jobs and job
candidates has consequences for both employers and potential
employees. When employers lack information about qualified
minority candidates, they may be more likely to practice statistical
discrimination, making decisions based on average characteristics
215. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (citing studies which have
found extremely low levels of support for affirmative action policies).
216. See SNIDERMAN & CARMINES, supra note 5, at 10-11 (discussing the
complexities of designing policies concerning race).
217. There is no obvious reason why the model couldn't be extended to other
problems of race (or gender) discrimination and most notably affirmative action in
education.
218. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA's
definition of discrimination as a departure from past civil rights laws).
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or stereotypes of certain groups rather than on the qualifications
of individual candidates. 219 At the same time, potential candidates
are placed at a competitive disadvantage in the labor market when
they lack information on job opportunities due to informal
recruitment and promotion procedures that fail to reach minority
candidates.
In a recent study of 3200 employers, Professors Holzer and
Neumark found that affirmative action in recruiting methods 2 0
successfully increases the hiring of women and minorities.22 1
Establishments using affirmative action in recruiting are more
likely to use intensive screening methods that enable them to
identify more qualified women and minority candidates. 222 The
authors argue that by using more intensive screening methods,
employers obtain additional information about each candidate and
pay less attention to more obvious-but potentially more
limiting-signals of quality such as education, previous
employment, and criminal history.223 This additional information
on individual candidates, the authors suggest, diminishes the
probability that employers will practice statistical
discrimination. 224 Other forms of affirmative action which aid the
free flow of information in the employment context may include
affirmative marketing and data collection and disclosure of
statistics regarding minority participation and success.
219. See HARRY J. HOLZER & DAVID NEUMARK, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON
POVERTY, WHAT DOES AFFIRMATIVE ACTION Do? 55 (1988) (suggesting that when
employers obtain more information, they pay less attention to noisier signals, such
as education, previous employment and criminal history).
220. Recruitment methods included walk-ins, referral from employees/others,
state/community agency, private agency, newspaper, and referral from
unions/schools. See Holzer & Neumark, supra note 219, at 8.
221. See id. at 29, 48 (finding that the candidates hired under affirmative action
recruiting plans are no less qualified than other hires and in fact perform better
than White and male coworkers).
222. See id. at 44 (stating that screening methods included whether a test/work
sample was required, whether a drug test/physical was required, whether the
employer checked references, whether the employer checked education, whether
the employer checked criminal records, whether a written application was required,
and whether an interview was required). The authors found that with the
exception of requiring an interview, employers who used affirmative action in
recruiting or hiring were more likely to make use of each type of screening method.
See id. at 24.
223. See id. at 35, 55 (noting employers who use affirmative action in recruiting
tend to increase the pool of qualified minority candidates and also appear more
willing to consider hiring those with stigmatizing personal characteristics and
histories).
224. See id. at 55 (finding employers are less likely to practice statistical
discrimination and pay less attention to qualities such as education, previous
employment and criminal history when they obtain more information).
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These information-driven forms of affirmative action are
explicitly nonpreferential-they neither mandate quotas nor set
aside any particular benefit based on race. Their aim is solely to
increase the pool of qualified minorities by informing them of a
benefit that had previously been foreclosed to them because of
biased decisionmaking. 225 By taking affirmative steps to level the
playing field with regard to employment opportunities, this form of
of affirmative action appeals to American Egalitarianism.
Additionally, these information driven forms of affirmative action
do not violate the principle of individualism by awarding a benefit
on a basis other than individual talent, effort, and training. They
expand the pool of qualified candidates but do not make exceptions
for what constitutes "qualified." For this reason, such policies may
be framed as opportunity-enhancing rather than result oriented.
Finally, because the policies tend to generate more
information about all candidates (regardless of race), employers
are more likely to evaluate candidates on a wider range of
characteristics. 226 More rigorous screening processes-such as the
use of a written application, a test/work sample, or an interview-
provide applicants with the opportunity to convey to employers
positive work characteristics not visible to the employer who relies
on more limited screening procedures such as reference and
education checks. Because more rigorous screening methods
afford candidates greater opportunities to represent themselves,
the policies are more likely to comport with prevailing notions of
procedural fairness. Thus, information-driven, race-targeted
affirmative action policies conform to all four of the criteria
previously discussed as necessary for popular support.227
One could argue however, that such forms of affirmative
action fail to address one of the more substantive motivations for
affirmative action generally: opportunities alone are often not
enough to level the playing field. No amount of recruiting, for
example, can assist those who were given inferior education or
have received little to no job training. Without simultaneous
attention to skill formation, information-driven affirmative action
policies cannot address the more fundamental effects of this
country's history of race discrimination on racial and ethnic
minorities. It is this issue that may particularly benefit from the
225. See Adams, supra note 13, at 1397.
226. See Holzer & Neumark, supra note 219, at 32 (suggesting that as employers
gather more information, they are willing to hire people with negative
characteristics).
227. See supra Part I.E.
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ADA's approach to affirmative action.
2. Skill Formation
There is considerable evidence that economic restructuring
over the last two decades has caused declines in manufacturing
employment, which in turn has had disproportionately negative
effects on the earnings or employment, or both, of Blacks. 228 The
combination of increased world market competitiveness, new
technologies, and the spread of innovative approaches to
production design have shifted demand for labor from the less
educated and poorly skilled to the more educated and highly
skilled. 229 The increased demand for skilled labor has magnified
the disadvantages Blacks suffer from their lower skill levels in the
labor market 230 and suggests that the issue of skill formation is of
crucial significance for minorities.
Most businesses in the United States do not spend enough on
job training.23 ' The reason for this is endemic to a market
228. See WILSON, supra note 84, at 39-46 ; JAMES JOHNSON & MELVIN OLIVER,
Structural Changes in the U.S. Economy and Black Male Joblessness: A
Reassessment, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 113 (G. Peterson
& W. Vroman eds., 1992) (analyzing the decline of central-city manufacturing
employment); Gregory Acs & Sheldon Danziger, Educational Attainment,
Industrial Structure, and Male Earnings: 1980's, 28 J. OF HUM. RESOURCES 619
(1993) (finding shifts in industrial employment patterns had a larger effect among
Blacks than among Whites and Hispanics); see also John Bound & Harry Holzer,
Industrial Shifts, Skills Levels, and the Labor Market for White and Black Males,
75 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 387 (1993) (finding demand shifts away from
manufacturing resulted in 40%-50% unemployment for less-educated young Blacks
in the 1970s).
229. See CARL W. STEINBERG III AND WILLIAM G. COLMAN, AMERICA'S FUTURE
WORK FORCE 32-35 (1994) (citing government statistics that show above average
growth among jobs requiring relatively higher levels of education and training);
James N. Danziger, Social Science and the Social Impacts of Computer Technology,
66 SOC. SCI. Q. 3 (1985) (discussing how new technologies and methods have
created a demand for workers with greater skills and training); see also Randy
Hodson et al., Customized Training in the Workplace, 19 WORK & OCC. 272, 273-76
(1992) (discussing the current demand for new skills).
230. See STEINBERG & COLMAN, supra note 229, at 33 (suggesting the earnings
increase for college graduates may well be the result of a worse market for high
school graduates); John Bound & Richard Freeman, What Went Wrong? The
Erosion of Relative Earnings and Employment Anwng Young Black Men in the
1980s, 107 Q. J. OF ECON. 201 (1992); see also John Bound & George Johnson,
Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980's: An Evaluation of Alternative
Explanations, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 371 (1992).
231. See Hodson et al., supra note 229, at 276-77; see also Wolfgang Streek,
Skills and the Limits of Neo-Liberalisn" The Enterprise of the Future as a Place of
Learning, 3 WORK, EMPLOYMENT & SOC. 89, 93 (1989) (stating that United States
firms tend to invest training for their blue collar work forces only in times of rapid
technological change and even then, only for their most skilled maintenance
workers and not for the bulk of their blue collar workers).
[Vol. 18:85
20001 REASONABLYACCOMMODATING RACE 125
economy in which the free labor contract reigns: firms can never
appropriate the skills imparted to a worker. 232 Skills instead
become the property of the worker, a form of capital workers may
take with them when they leave, and which firms, because they
cannot own, lack an incentive to provide. 233 Because workers in an
open labor market have the right to move from one firm to
another, firms will always be concerned that competitors will
"poach" a firm's trained workers by offering them a higher wage
without themselves investing in training.234  Thus, because
employers are loath to invest in training that they may lose to
competitors, and competitors will not invest in training for the
same reasons, the result is a chronic lack of skilled labor.235 As
one commentator put it: "If training is left to the market, there
will be no training."236
Subsidized on-the-job training programs237 have become
popular as a way of compensating for this poor investment in
training.238 Funding for training programs has primarily come
from the states, although the goal for such funding is typically to
induce businesses to relocate, rather than to re-skill any segment
of the labor force.239 Training may include anything from basic
literacy and mathematics classes to advanced classes in blueprint
reading and statistical process control, to cross training in new
skills and advanced training in electronics. 240
Holzer and Neumark found that job training for minority
workers hired under nonpreferential affirmative action recruiting
policies tended to out-perform White, male workers. 241 Employers
232. See Streek, supra note 231, at 93.
233. See id.
234. See Hodson et al., supra note 229, at 277.
235. See Streek, supra note 231, at 94. By contrast, in countries where skill is
treated as a collective good, "poaching" may be prevented by government
regulation. See id. at 95-96.
236. See id. at 94.
237. Studies have found that on-the-job training programs are far more effective
in skill formation than vocational training schools. See Hodson et al., supra note
229, at 273; Streek, supra note 231, at 98-99. Between 1929 and 1982, on the job
training is estimated to have been responsible for 55% of the improvements in labor
productivity, compared to only 26% for pre-employment schooling. See EDWARD F.
DENISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1929-1982, 30 (1984).
238. See Hodson et al., supra note 229, at 277 (finding that state sponsorship
and funds are often important parts of a state's proposal for enticing a new
manufacturing facility to locate in the state).
239. See id. at 277-78.
240. See id. at 281-82 (describing the various training programs).
241. Holzer & Neumark, supra note 219, at 48 (surveys indicating women and
minorities hired under affirmative action program perform better than White
males).
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who provided job training to minority workers hired under
preferential affirmative hiring policies (workers who tend to be, on
average, less qualified than other workers) appeared to offset any
differentials in qualifications such that the performance of
affirmative action hires was generally not inferior to that of other
workers. 242
The benefits of investments in skill formation extend not only
to employers but to workers as well. The skills employees gain
through job training improve their ability to earn better wages, to
qualify for more jobs, and to earn promotions and other benefits.243
Training provides individuals with the ability to compete
effectively in an economy in which state-of-the-art skills are amply
rewarded.
Given the need for and benefits of skill formation, then, the
prospects for tying job training to a politically successful
affirmative action plan seem promising. One possibility would
involve state subsidized job training programs similar to those
used to entice businesses to relocate. Rather than using relocation
as the condition for subsidization, however, skill-driven
affirmative action programs would require implementation of
information-driven affirmative action policies such as those
discussed in the previous section. Firms would not be required to
hire a certain number of minority applicants, but must instead
demonstrate that their recruiting and screening methods are
intended to maximize the applicant pool for qualified minorities. 244
Once a business has met its burden in implementing
information-driven affirmative action procedures, state subsidies
would then assist in funding training for those hired from that
applicant pool. Here policymakers could choose between providing
job training for all workers who need it-regardless of race--or
limiting the training to minority candidates only. While a
stronger case can always be made for nonpreferential affirmative
action in any attempt to garner public support, 245 an affirmative
242. See id. (stating employers will take steps to offset the less-qualified hires).
243. Hodson et al., supra note 229, at 287 (discussing the effects of skills
training on the workforce).
244. Whether firms decide to change the qualifications they seek in applicants
based on the availability of subsidized training programs--thereby enlarging the
applicant pool still farther-is a choice firms could make on an individual basis.
245. There is evidence that there are ways of framing race-targeted affirmative
action policies in ways that generate near majority or majority levels of support
from the public. See SNIDERMAN & CARMINES, supra note 5, at 121; see also Bobo &
Kluegel, supra note 38, at 460 (suggesting that framing policy as "opportunity-
enhancing", even when race-targeted, is a politically viable approach). Sniderman
and Carmines found that Whites were approximately half again as likely to support
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action policy that focuses both on information and training-
whether race targeted or not-would satisfy the four criteria
outlined in this paper. First, like the ADA, a policy that focuses on
skill formation comports with Americans' spirit of egalitarianism
and individualism. It is individualist in its emphasis on equal
opportunity and a level playing field rather than equal results. It
is egalitarian in that it provides workers with the substantive
tools to improve their place in the marketplace.
Second, it offers "individual-based remedies." Like the ADA's
reasonable accommodation provision, which applies only to
qualified employees based on individual need, a skill-driven
affirmative action policy would provide job training only to
qualified hires and then only on an individualized basis,
depending on the candidate's incoming skills, the requirements of
his or her job, and the resources of the firm. Under policies in
which employers provide training regardless of race, nobody
receives a benefit by virtue of group status alone. Explicitly race-
targeted job training policies would arguably follow the ADA
model more faithfully: minorities would be targeted by the policy,
but group status alone would not determine whether one would
receive the benefit of job training; nor would it determine how
much job training one is entitled to receive.
Third, because the policy is expressly concerned with
information and skill formation rather than hiring (although both
information and skill formation would presumably increase the
rate of hires for minority candidates), 246 it is not difficult to frame
the policy as opportunity-enhancing rather than results oriented.
Finally, a policy which combines information-driven
affirmative action practices with job training offers job candidates
and employees greater opportunities to "participate"247 in decisions
job training programs for Blacks if the policy argument was made on grounds that
were universal, applying equally to Blacks and Whites (e.g., "because the
government ought to help people who are out of work and want to find a job") than
if the justification was race-targeted (e.g., "because of the historic injustices blacks
have suffered"). See SNIDERMAN & CARMINES, supra note 5, at 121. Bobo and
Kluegel found that race-targeted policies which were framed as opportunity
enhancing received more support than policies framed as results oriented. See
Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 38, at 460. But there is also evidence that race-
targeting diminishes Whites' support for affirmative action policies, regardless of
how they are framed. See id. at 458. Bobo and Kluegel found, for example, that
race targeting diminishes support for opportunity-enhancing affirmative action
policies by about 22% relative to similar income-targeted policies. See id.
246. See Holzer & Neumark, supra note 219, at 3 (finding that affirmative action
in recruiting and hiring tends to increase the number of minority applicants as well
as employees).
247. This Article uses the term "participate" loosely--candidates participate in
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about hiring and job training, and as a consequence is more likely
to be perceived by other workers as fair. Affirmative action
recruiting practices like those outlined in Part IV.A.4 allow
employees to present themselves as a product of something other
than their education credentials and criminal histories. Similarly,
because of the wide variability in job training options-from basic
reading and math skills assistance to high level electronics
training-employees can work with employers to establish
training priorities in ways that parallel employee/employer
interactions under the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision.
Thus, state subsidized job training in firms which have
implemented rigorous information-driven affirmative action
practices, would seem to comport with the criteria which social
science research has identified as necessary for a viable
affirmative action policy and which have been so strikingly
embodied in the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision.
Further research is undoubtedly needed to quantify how such a
policy would affect the employability and income of minority
workers. Additional scholarship which applies such a framework
to the context of other race-related issues (e.g., education) and to
the context of gender are also needed. This Article is not intended
to prescribe the specifics of any given affirmative action policy, but
instead to demonstrate how the ADA's affirmative action provision
might plausibly be applied to the context of race-based policy in
employment.
Conclusion
Race-targeted affirmative action measures have suffered
from a striking lack of popular support in this country. While
opponents of such measures have mobilized an effective legal and
public relations campaign, proponents of affirmative action have
yet to engage in any sustained effort to design innovative
programs which both achieve the goals of the modern-day Civil
Rights Movement and pass muster with the American public.
This Article looked at social science research on attitudes toward
principles of equality and affirmative action to identify those
characteristics of an affirmative action policy that would be
amenable to majority America. It then tested the viability of those
criteria by examining their role in the passage of the ADA,
the sense that they have more of an opportunity to represent themselves to
employers who use more rigorous screening methods to hire. This is not to suggest
that they necessarily participate in the decisionmaking process.
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arguably the most aggressive, politically successful affirmative
action law in U.S. history. Four criteria played a critical role in
the ADA's success: (1) the framing of the ADA during floor debates
as an issue of American values, as well as its design as (2) an
opportunity-enhancing law (3) with individual remedies (4) that
comport with generalized notions of procedural fairness. It is
these basic criteria which policymakers should utilize in the
context of race-based affirmative action to design effective
affirmative action policies which neither compromise the agenda of
the modern-day Civil Rights Movement, nor suffer at the hands of
a hostile American public.

